13th May 2026
A recurring narrative occasionally appears on investor discussion forums suggesting that companies such as Scirocco, Wentworth and Orca were somehow “forced into submission” by the Tanzanian authorities. While such claims can make for dramatic discussion, the underlying historical picture appears considerably more nuanced when examined in detail.
Each company operated under very different commercial circumstances, contractual structures and strategic priorities. In several cases, the outcomes now often attributed solely to Tanzanian policy decisions appear to have been shaped just as heavily — if not more so — by board-level corporate strategy, shareholder considerations, capital allocation decisions and changing business models within the companies themselves.
That distinction matters because Tanzania’s current investment environment is increasingly becoming central to the long-term Aminex investment case.
The case of Scirocco Energy, formerly Solo Oil, is perhaps the clearest example where corporate direction appears to have played the dominant role.
Following the retirement of Executive Chairman Neil Ritson in 2018, the company shifted away from its Tanzanian oil and gas strategy and instead pivoted toward European renewables and biomass opportunities. The strategic transition was not well received by the market, and the newer investments ultimately failed to generate the returns many shareholders had hoped for.
By May 2024, the company had delisted and entered into a Members’ Voluntary Liquidation process designed to distribute remaining cash to shareholders.
Viewed in that context, it becomes difficult to conclude that Tanzania itself was the primary driver behind Scirocco’s decline. The evidence instead suggests the company’s own strategic redirection away from Tanzanian hydrocarbons played the decisive role.
The situation surrounding Wentworth Resources appears considerably different again.
In 2023, Wentworth agreed to a takeover by Maurel & Prom at 32.5p per share, representing a substantial premium to the prevailing market price. The transaction generated strong returns for many shareholders while simultaneously allowing executives and option holders to crystallise significant value through the company’s long-term incentive structures.
Importantly, Wentworth’s financial position at the time does not appear to indicate a company being pushed out under distress. Public filings showed the business remained debt free and held substantial cash reserves. However, the commercial backdrop surrounding the Mnazi Bay asset was changing.
For many years, Wentworth had benefited from favourable cost recovery economics under its PSA structure. As those historical recoveries began approaching maturity, investors increasingly focused on the future capital requirements needed to maintain and expand production. At the same time, major drilling expenditure loomed on the horizon.
Some investors subsequently argued that the takeover offered management and shareholders a commercially attractive route to crystallise value before entering a more capital-intensive phase of field development. Others believed the Board accepted the offer too readily rather than retaining exposure to a strategically valuable Tanzanian gas asset.
Indeed, some major shareholders reportedly opposed the transaction on the grounds that the long-term value of the underlying Tanzanian assets may have exceeded the immediate takeover premium being offered.
Viewed through that lens, the Wentworth outcome appears far more consistent with a conventional corporate acquisition shaped by shareholder and management incentives than with any suggestion of Tanzania “forcing out” the company.
The Orca Energy situation is materially more complex and requires considerably greater nuance.
Unlike many other operators in Tanzania, Orca operated under a highly unusual and historically sensitive contractual framework tied to the Songo Songo PSA. Part of this structure involved “Protected Gas” arrangements under which gas was supplied to the state under terms that differed from the company’s commercial “Additional Gas” operations.
Over time, disagreements emerged regarding cost allocation methodologies between these different categories of gas production. Tanzanian parliamentary scrutiny around these arrangements dates back many years and contributed to a relationship that increasingly appeared strained at both political and regulatory levels.
Importantly, these issues should not automatically be interpreted as findings of wrongdoing. Rather, they appear to reflect long-running disputes and differing interpretations surrounding the structure and economics of a uniquely complex legacy contract.
At the same time, Orca’s corporate strategy increasingly emphasised shareholder capital returns. Company presentations and public disclosures show significant funds being returned to shareholders over recent years through:
dividends
share buybacks
and capital return programmes.
Critics within Tanzania occasionally argued that insufficient reinvestment was taking place relative to the scale of value being extracted from the asset. Orca, meanwhile, maintained that capital discipline and shareholder returns formed part of its stated corporate strategy.
That debate appears to have intensified as operational difficulties emerged. Orca’s attempted 3D seismic programme ultimately failed to progress as planned and later became subject to legal dispute with contractors. The SS-7 intervention programme also failed to restore sustained production flows despite substantial expenditure.
By the time renewal discussions surrounding the PSA emerged, the broader relationship between the company and the Tanzanian authorities already appeared considerably strained.
Whether the ultimate outcome reflected politics, commercial frustration, operational underperformance or simply diverging strategic priorities remains open to interpretation. However, the available evidence suggests the situation was considerably more complex than simplistic claims that the company was merely “forced into submission.”
Perhaps the most important point often overlooked in these discussions is what has happened elsewhere within Tanzania’s energy sector during the same period.
While debates around Orca, Wentworth and Scirocco have dominated some investor forums, other companies continue committing substantial capital to Tanzanian energy development.
Aminex and ARA Petroleum accelerated rapidly following the change in political direction under President Samia Suluhu Hassan. Within a relatively short period:
East Africa’s largest onshore 3D seismic campaign was mobilised and completed
the Gas Sales Agreement was signed
the 25-year Development Licence was formally awarded
pipeline infrastructure moved into construction phase
and preparations for drilling and production accelerated.
At the same time:
Maurel & Prom continues operating within Tanzania
new interest has reportedly emerged around Songo Songo
international LNG discussions continue advancing
and major global energy companies remain engaged in Tanzanian projects.
Increasingly, Tanzania appears to be positioning itself as one of East Africa’s most strategically important long-term gas economies.
The broader significance for Aminex investors may therefore lie less in revisiting historical forum narratives and more in understanding how Tanzania’s current policy direction appears to align with Aminex’s long-term development pathway.
The Tanzanian government is visibly pushing:
domestic gas utilisation
industrialisation
pipeline expansion
regional energy integration
and long-term energy infrastructure growth.
Aminex and ARA’s development plans appear strongly aligned with those priorities.
That alignment may ultimately prove important because governments tend to support projects that reinforce broader national strategic objectives. Increasingly, Ntorya appears positioned within exactly that type of framework.
The historical experiences of Scirocco, Wentworth and Orca appear materially different from the simplified narrative sometimes repeated within investor discussions.
One company pivoted away from Tanzanian hydrocarbons entirely. Another accepted a commercially attractive takeover. A third operated under a uniquely sensitive legacy contractual framework that appears to have generated long-running tensions over many years.
None of those situations neatly supports the idea that Tanzania is broadly hostile toward energy investment.
In fact, the wider evidence increasingly points in the opposite direction.
Tanzania continues attracting substantial interest across:
gas infrastructure
LNG development
pipeline construction
regional energy integration
and upstream gas expansion.
Against that backdrop, Aminex and ARA Petroleum now appear positioned at the centre of a country increasingly focused on building a much larger long-term gas economy.
Contributing Author: Ufufuo